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In this paper, we propose an autonomous vending
machine that is governed by a public Blockchain and
smart contracts platform. Set up as a decentralized
autonomous organization, it serves as an open
marketplace for physical goods, where anyone can buy
and/or sell objects. We propose a basic architecture
for the machine, analyze pricing and fee mechanisms
and examine potential pitfalls. Moreover, we discuss
open issues, possible extensions and further areas for
improvement. We conclude that the deployment of such
machines could significantly improve our understanding
of decentralized autonomous organizations and build a
bridge between virtual and physical markets. Insights
gained from such an experiment may raise important
questions for further research.
1. Introduction
Public Blockchain networks such as Bitcoin [1] and
Ethereum [2, 3] allow anyone to store and transfer value
in a secure and autonomous way. In particular, there
is no need for a central bookkeeper and transactions
cannot be censored or modified, [4]. Unfortunately,
basic transfers are limited to the respective Blockchain’s
native protocol asset, i.e., BTC in the case of the
Bitcoin Blockchain and ETH in the case of the Ethereum
Blockchain. There are, however, ways to create
on-chain representations of additional assets. Such
representations are usually referred to as (Blockchain)
tokens.
Despite a broad variety of ways to issue tokens,
smart contract-based token creation is the predominant
issuance form, with Ethereum as the primary platform
of choice, [5]. Fungible tokens are usually created
in compliance with the ERC-20 token standard [6],
while non-fungible tokens (collectibles) mostly use the
ERC-721 interface specifications, [7]. Using one of
these standards, new tokens can be created.
One key issue of tokens is counterparty risk. If the
issuer promises something in exchange for the token,
the respective token’s value will directly depend on the
issuer’s reputation. If the issuer is not willing or capable
to deliver on its promise, then demand for and thus the
value of the token will collapse, [5]. For purely virtual
assets this may be addressed by embedding the token’s
utility in a smart contract. For tokenized physical assets
or services that cannot be natively fulfilled on-chain,
counterparty risk remains a critical aspect.
The problem arises from the separation of legal
ownership1 (the token) and the control over the physical
asset. If, for example, someone tokenizes a baseball
card, the token may very well represent a legal claim
on the underlying physical asset. However, if the token
owner is unable to access the baseball card, a claim may
be worthless or at least impaired by the enforcement
cost. Consequently, Blockchain-based tokens can be
used to accurately track the ownership of a physical
asset, but do not inherently address counterparty risk.
The protection of the holder’s interest against fraudulent
issuers has been one of the driving forces in many
jurisdictions to classify tokenized promises as securities
subject to respective regulation. Compliance with such
regulation typically creates a significant cost burden for
the issuer, and thus renders small scale tokenization
of ownership effectively impossible. Furthermore,
security regulations typically restrict trading activities to
1in some cases it is not even clear if the token represents a legal
claim.






One way to address counterparty risk for promises
of physical goods is through escrow or custody services.
Building on this approach, we propose a new type
of vending machine that links the delivery and the
purchase of goods atomically, i.e., in an inseparable way.
The exact conditions and procedures are transparently
embedded in and deterministically executed by a smart
contract system. Residing on a public Blockchain, these
contracts form a decentralized autonomous organization
(DAO) that controls the vending machine.
While the basic setup we are describing is not
a perfect protection mechanism, it is a step towards
a transparent, open and independent peer-to-peer
marketplace for physical goods that can be regarded as a
form of public infrastructure. There are many interesting
applications involving physical objects, where the
basic properties of such a vending machine could be
leveraged. Last but not least, it is somewhat symbolic
that the vending machine, which was among the first
examples of a smart contract [8, 9], shall serve as a
prototype for a physical incarnation of a decentralized
autonomous organization (DAO).
2. Basic Setup
The basic setup for the envisioned open peer-to-peer
vending machine consists of two main elements.
First, the machine, i.e., the actual physical vending
machine including the required software to connect
to the Blockchain and translate the signals received
into corresponding actions. Secondly, the DAO in
form of a dedicated smart contract structure on a
public Blockchain. The former provides a physical
incarnation, while the latter governs the behavior of
the machine and controls the logic and conditions of
the interactions. It is fully transparent, protected from
unforeseen intervention, and open to anyone.
2.1. The Machine
Let us assume that the machine consists of N > 0
slots (1). Each slot shows a unique identifier (2) and
has a goods compartment with a transparent door that
can be locked individually. It also has a display (3) to
assist users in their interactions. The vending machine is
located in a public space. It is easily accessible, meaning
that anyone can interact with the vending machine by
assuming the role of a buyer or seller.
Buying works in the traditional way. When someone
sees a good in the vending machine for which they have
a buy interest at the given price, they can buy it instantly.
The main difference to a regular vending machine is
that instead of buying from a central counterparty, i.e.,
Figure 1. Illustration Basic Vending Machine
the vending machine operator, the buyer engages in a
peer-to-peer transaction with someone who placed the
object in the machine.
Analogously, selling via the vending machine is
open to anyone, provided there is a currently unused
slot. A seller simply places the goods in the
compartment and provides the sales parameters, such
as pricing. The machine will then initiate the sale and
take over custody by locking the door. Thereafter, no
further action is required of the seller, the proceeds are
automatically distributed after a successful sale.
2.2. The DAO
Both the buying and the selling process are governed
by the DAO’s smart contracts. To release goods or lock
a compartment, the machine relies on events emitted by
the DAO. Also, it is the source for the currently valid
parameters on pricing and fees, which are detailed later
on.
To increase the autonomy of the DAO, i.e., reducing
the dependency on humans [10], the smart contract
structure may be designed to cover a multitude of
aspects. For the basic setup, however, we propose a lean
structure that focuses on the autonomous handling of the
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core processes of buying and selling goods through the
machine, plus a governance mechanism to propose and
vote on fee parameter changes or extraordinary events.
While it is possible to interact with the machine
directly via smart contract function calls, a simple user
interface is proposed to lower the barriers to entry
for potential users with limited Blockchain and smart
contract knowledge. To provide a basic user experience,
the machine has a display to guide through the buying
and selling process as well as a button next to each slot




Anyone interested in the goods in one of the slots
can press the button next to it. The machine then queries
the sales parameters on the Blockchain and displays the
current price plus a prepared buy transaction in form of a
QR code. To accept the offer, the buyer can scan the QR
code, sign the entailed transaction proposal and relay it
to the Blockchain network using a mobile web3 wallet.
Once the buy transaction is successfully confirmed, the
vending machine releases the goods from custody by
unlocking the corresponding slot’s door.2 The buyer is
now free to pick up the goods.
Figure 2. UML diagram buyer
3.2. Sell
Whenever a slot is vacant, anyone can use the
vending machine to offer goods for sale. The seller
deposits the goods in the compartment, closes the door
and enters the desired parameters for the offer with
regards to pricing and duration. The machine queries
the current fee schedule (to be detailed later on) on
2In practice, this will require a certain number of confirmations to
defend against double spending attacks and reorgs.
the Blockchain and displays a transaction proposal in
the form of a QR code. To confirm the conditions and
initiate the sale, the seller can scan, sign and relay the
proposed transaction to the Blockchain network with a
mobile web3 wallet. When the transaction is confirmed,
the door of the slot locks and the goods are ready to be
sold. In case of a successful sale, the seller receives the
proceeds automatically from the vending machine with
no need for further interactions.
Figure 3. UML diagram seller
3.3. Price Determination
The price to be paid to purchase a good is determined
through an open descending-bid auction format (Dutch
auction). In this format, the bid price for the goods of
a slot decreases linearly over time from a starting value
set by the seller, until the first interested buyer accepts
and thus closes the sale. The sale is final and since the
buy transaction has to contain sufficient funds, there is
no buyer default risk.
Formally, the current price P (t) can be expressed
as shown in equation (1), where time is measured in
blocks3 with t denoting the current period, ts the starting
period of the auction, and T the period the price reaches
0.








The price decreases linearly (subject to variations in
block time) hereby the price at any t can be described
using P (ts), ts and T .
The Dutch auction format is relatively simple to
implement in a smart contract and the instant purchase
3Mining is a probabilistic process. The average block time differs
for each proof-of-work Blockchain network. For Ethereum, the
expected block time is between 10 and 20 seconds, for Bitcoin it is
around 10 minutes.
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nature of a bid is a good fit for the basic vending
machine scenario. Furthermore, limitations regarding
the choice of sales parameter T at the beginning prohibit
extension of the sale. Also, T serves as an important
parameter for the fee schedule discussed in Section
4. This outweighs the drawback of Dutch auctions
that strategic interactions of buyers may not lead to an
optimal outcome in terms of overall welfare, [11], [12].
If a sale is unsuccessful, i.e., the time limit T is
reached and the price has decreased to zero without
a valid bid, the machine unlocks the slot and releases
the goods for anyone to pick up for free. Unless the
seller is present at the machine, the loss of the goods
without any reimbursement is likely. An alternative
approach to handle this case would be to include a grace
period, during which the seller can repossess the goods.
Arguments against this are twofold. First, the slot would
be blocked throughout this period with no sale going
on, thus decreasing the utility as public infrastructure.
Secondly, the risk for the seller to part with the goods
for an amount only marginally greater than zero would
still be present.
4. Fee Schedule
While anyone can use an empty slot and offer
goods for sale, the number of slots is limited and the
vending machine incurs operating costs. To set the
right incentives for efficient use of the infrastructure and
provide an income source for the vending machine, a fee
schedule must be defined.
In this section, we analyze different models for fee
schedules, covering price-based, time-based and mixed
fee implementations. In addition to the fees, which are
driven by the sales parameters, the vending machine
may charge a fixed fee ϵ per auction.
To keep the price presentation to buyers
straightforward, fees are always owed by the seller.
Any outstanding fees will be deducted from the amount
paid by the buyer before the remaining proceeds are
disbursed to the seller.
4.1. Time-based Fee
The basic idea of the time-based fee is to charge the
seller depending on the duration that the slot is occupied.
For this purpose, the vending machine maintains a
fee parameter φ per block. This value depends on
the targeted yearly revenue ỹ, the expected utilization






To protect the vending machine in case of an
unsuccessful auction, the seller has to deposit a
collateral C that corresponds to the fee for the maximum
sale duration defined at the initiation of the auction with
T . The difference between the maximum fee and the
actual fee will be returned to the seller’s wallet when the
sale closes – alongside the payment for the good.
C = (T − ts) · φ+ ϵ (3)
The actual fee earned by the machine πv is a function
of t at the sale’s closure.
πv(t) = (t− ts) · φ+ ϵ (4)
With C due at initiation, a time-based fee schedule
incentivizes the seller to carefully choose T , thus
promoting frequent turnover and efficient allocation of
the slots. However, since time-based fees exclusively
depend on the duration of the auction, there is no
differentiation with regards to the value of the goods
sold. This may be problematic, as high value goods will
likely increase the probability of physical attacks and the
cost for insurance policies. As such, a purely time-based








Figure 4. Time-based fee schedule with ϵ = 0.
4.2. Price-based Fee
The price-based fee defines the income of the
vending machine as a fraction ρ of the sales price P (t).
This fee parameter is set by the DAO.
πv(t) = P (t) · ρ+ ϵ (5)
The price-based fee does not require any collateral,
so beyond any base fee ϵ, no payment from the seller is
required to initiate the sale. The vending machine may
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simply retain the outstanding fee from P (t) paid by the
buyer when disbursing D(t) to the seller.
D(t) = P (t) · (1− ρ) (6)
Since P (t) is linearly decreasing in t and πv equals
any fixed base fee ϵ plus a fraction of P (t), it can
be easily shown that ∂πv∂t < 0. This relationship is







P (t) · (1− ρ)
P (t)
πv(t)
Figure 5. Price-based fee schedule with ϵ = 0
This model has several drawbacks. First, the vending
machine’s potential income decreases over the duration
of the auction and may reach zero. If no fixed fee
ϵ is charged, the machine’s income is fully dependent
on the demand for the goods offered for sale. This is
problematic, since the vending machine has no influence
on the objects that are being offered for sale. Secondly,
sellers have no incentive to use the slots efficiently.
Consequently, this opens the possibility for malicious
actors to block slots by placing worthless goods in the
machine and setting the maximum values for P (ts) and
T as sales parameter. Apart from the network fees
for the initiating transaction, this would render the slot
useless at no cost for the attacker.
4.3. Mixed Fee
In a mixed fee schedule, the fee is determined by
duration and sales price.
πv(t) = P (t) · ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
price element





Recall that time-based fees increase over the
duration of the auction towards the maximum amount of
C at T , whereas price-based fees are a fraction of P (t)
and therefore decrease linearly over time. As a result,
the first derivative of πv with respect to t depends on
the parametrization of the machine regarding φ and ρ in
combination with the sales parameters P (ts) and T set
by the seller. This is summarized in table 1.
Table 1. The three cases of mixed fee structures
P (ts) · ρ ∂πv∂t
Negative time return > C < 0
Constant time return = C = 0
Positive time return < C > 0
As soon as the machine acquires a certain transaction
history, the average actual sale durations and sales prices
may be used to recalibrate the fee parameters φ and
ρ. This, in combination with the incentivization for
efficient utilization and participation in proceeds from
successful sales, leads us to conclude that a mixed fee
schedule may be the best option to realize the goals and








(t− ts) · φ
P (t)
P (t) · ρ
πv(t)
Figure 6. Mixed fee schedule with negative time
return and ϵ = 0
5. Security
With the machine as an IoT device in a public
space and the DAO as a set of open source smart
contracts deployed on a public Blockchain, there are
many potential security issues. For the scope of this
paper, we assume the integrity of the Blockchain, the
smart contracts and the physical machine itself. We
propose basic measures for securing the connection
between the machine and its governing DAO as well as
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for protecting the sale process against front running.
5.1. Connection
A secure connection between the physical machine
and the public Blockchain the DAO contracts are
deployed on is essential for the vending machine. Due
to its size and connection to the power grid, the vending
machine is not subject to the same limitations many
IoT devices face [13] and can easily run its own full
Blockchain node. However, by simply hijacking the
ethernet connection of the machine with a network of
fake nodes, or by infiltrating the peer connections of the
machine node on the actual Blockchain network through
an eclipse attack [14], the physical machine may be
isolated from the rest of the network. Monopolizing all
peer communication of an unwitting vending machine
node, the attacker is in full control of the machine’s
information set and may feed it an imposter Blockchain
to effectively trick it into wrongfully releasing goods.
The vulnerability of the vending machine to such
imposter attacks depends on the protocol specifications
of the Blockchain network, as well as the client
configuration. Both on network [15] and on client level
[16], mitigation ideas are emerging relying on observed
behavior of nodes, i.e., their reputation. Adopting this
principle, we propose a whitelisting approach with N
known and trusted peers. The vending machine client is
modified such that (1) it prefers to connect to trusted
nodes and (2) unless M thereof can be connected to
successfully and continuously, the network connection
is not deemed secure. Moreover, all data exchanged
between the nodes is cryptographically signed to prevent
man-in-the-middle attacks. If no secure connection
can be established or maintained, the machine enters
an emergency protocol that entails a shut-down as the
ultimate step.
5.2. Front Running
The fully transparent nature of a public Blockchain
is a key aspect for the machine’s value proposition.
However, coupled with the Dutch auction format, this
transparency opens up the possibility of front running.
Consider a situation in which two agents are interested
in buying the same good. As per Dutch auction rules,
the first agent to broadcast a valid buy transaction to
the Blockchain should close the deal successfully. Due
to the Blockchain-inherent delay between broadcasting
and confirmation, however, the buy transaction may
be observed in the mempool. A second agent can
now interfere with a competing buy transaction. If the
attacker includes a higher transaction fee, consensus
relevant nodes have an incentive to prioritize the
second transaction. Apart from the frustration of
front-run agents, the possibility to outbid competitors
by monitoring the broadcast transactions may create
reluctance to buy as soon as an agent’s willingness to
pay for the good is reached. This lowers realized prices,
directly hurting the seller’s interest.
Among potential remedies are commit and reveal
schemes. This has been proposed previously to address
front running in the Dutch auction context [17]. The
scheme splits the information into two transactions
with the second (reveal) only relayed when the first
(commit) has reached a certain number of confirmations.
The commit-transaction locks the intent to purchase
but includes only the hash value of the information
identifying the targeted auction. Still visible to any
observer when broadcast, the cryptographic hash is
impossible to associate with any current offer. Only the
subsequent reveal-transaction, containing the clear-text
information, closes the sale.
A second, less nuanced but effective mitigation
approach would be to simply set a limit to the gas fees
for buy transactions that are accepted by the vending
machine’s smart contract. Transactions with gas fees
exceeding said limit are not accepted as valid.
While the phenomenon of front running must not be
classified as an attack on the integrity of the machine per
se, it is nevertheless an exploit that should be addressed
in order to avoid outcomes that impair the perceived
fairness of the public marketplace.
6. Extensions
6.1. Participation Token
In the basic setup, the vending machine does not
require an owner. It could be created as its own
independent entity. However, this independence could
lead to certain challenges. Alternatively, the vending
machine may issue tradable tokens that entail the right
to vote on governance proposals and participate in future
cash flows. This approach may be preferable for a
number of reasons.
First, the initial setup of the vending machine
will require significant investments. Analogous to
crowdfunding, a token sale may be a suitable way to
raise the required funds. In addition, the machine
could foster user adoption by granting buyers and sellers
micro-participation rights through fractions of tokens.
Secondly, tokenized participation rights would allow
the vending machine to react to a dynamic environment
and unforeseeable events. Token holders could create
proposals and cast votes in proportion to their token
holdings. Combining cash flow and voting rights in the
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same token may help to align interests and incentivize
token holders to act in the machine’s best interest.
Thirdly, a purely self-contained machine may raise
a variety of complex legal questions. In most
jurisdictions, it is not possible for a machine to be its
own legal entity. This is certainly an interesting concept
with increasing importance, but can lead to considerable
legal uncertainty.
6.2. Long-Term Custody
The utility of the vending machine can be extended
to the tokenization of physical goods. In this case,
goods are placed in the slots for the purpose of long-term
custody. The right to open a slot is tokenized in the form
of a non-fungible token (NFT). The vending machine
assumes the role of a custodian and guarantees that the
NFT can be redeemed for the asset in custody. This
approach has a variety of potential use cases.
First, the NFT could be traded without the need to
move the physical object. It could be part of an atomic
exchange against other NFTs or fungible cryptoassets,
thereby effectively eliminating counterparty risk.
Secondly, the NFT would allow various conditions,
such as timelocks, multisig and combinations thereof.
A collector could choose to store a collectible in the
machine and manage the NFT in a smart contract
that, under certain conditions, grants access to relatives,
business partners or friends. In this case, the
vending machine essentially becomes a programmable
safe deposit box with a large variety of use cases,
including collateralized loans, smart contract-based
implementations of a last will and the issuance of
sub-tokens which represent partial ownership of the
NFT.
The primary modifications required are with regards
to slot access, fee schedule and security measures.
6.2.1. Access A token owner may access a slot by
burning the NFT. The machine must wait for a sufficient
number of confirmations to ensure that the token has
been irreversibly burnt before releasing the physical
good. As with any tokenized promise, reorgs and forks
may lead to severe issues, [18].
6.2.2. Fees In the custody case, there is no reliable
price information. Consequently, the fee must be purely
time-based. This requires a collateral, the option to
top-up, and a protocol for what happens in case the
collateral is used up.
6.2.3. Security The goods in custody can reasonably
be expected to be of high value. As a result, the vending
machine must be more robust against physical attacks.
Moreover, it should be insured.
6.3. Reputation
Mere visual inspection of a good for sale may be
insufficient for a buyer to assess important aspects of
its value. This may increase the buyer’s perceived
risk [19], and lead to a market for lemons, [20]. To
assess important factors of goods, such as authenticity,
provenance, raw materials or production methods,
buyers often rely on brand names and labels (signalling
theory), [21]. Similarly, we propose an extension for the
vending machine that includes attributes of the seller’s
reputation.
Already in the basic setup, a seller may repeatedly
use the same Blockchain identity and build a brand. In
extension thereof, the machine can give the seller the
possibility to vouch for their honest behaviour by putting
a collateral at stake. One option could be that at sale
initiation, the seller may deliberately defer the payout of
the proceeds by the machine. This would grant the buyer
a grace period for fraud claims. As a second option,
the vending machine can offer a staking contract, where
a seller can lock up a variable amount. Both options
require a decision body to handle claims. Analogous
to resolution procedures in Blockchain-based prediction
markets, the seller can be given the flexibility to assign a
third party as an ombudsman. Alternatively, the machine
can foresee the handling through a participation token
holder vote.
Another approach would be the option to reference
Blockchain-based certifications tied to the identity
(address) used by the seller, [22, 23]. To create
trust, certificates (claims) are cryptographically signed
by trusted third parties and then timestamped using
Blockchain transactions. While there is considerable
flexibility with regards to format and way of storing or
referencing the data on-chain, the actual utility of this
approach fully depends on the buyer’s ability to access
and interpret the certificate.
A third approach is the restriction of the ability
to initiate sales to whitelisted addresses. However,
this scenario comes at considerable cost. First,
the management of whitelist entries requires human
intervention, either by a service provider or participation
token holders. Secondly, maintenance of an on-chain
whitelist contract may prove expensive over time.
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6.4. Decentralized Finance Interface
Integrating the vending machine with selected
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) protocols has the potential
to enrich the services offered to users and increase
overall benefit [24].
First, excess liquidity could be added to lending
protocols and constant function market maker (CFMM)
liquidity pools. Integrating with these protocols,
the vending machine could turn any idle liquidity
into interest-bearing deposits. Depending on the
fee schedule, the predictability of cash outflows may
vary. While purely time-based fees limit the vending
machine to liquid protocols, for which the assets can be
withdrawn at any time, mixed fee schedules are more
forgiving in this regard. In any case, the interest income
supplements the vending machine’s fee income.
Secondly, an integration with exchange protocols
would allow the vending machine to accept a large
variety of cryptoassets as means of payment. This
may significantly increase convenience for buyers at no
risk for the vending machine. Any payment would be
routed through a liquidity pool (internal transaction) and
thereby exchanged to the vending machine’s preferred
cryptoasset.
Thirdly, there are DeFi insurance protocols that
allow the vending machine to purchase cover against
financial losses from unintended (smart contract) code
use. This may increase trust and complement traditional
insurance against physical attack vectors. Additionally,
the mere existence of a smart contract insurance policy
implies that an expert third party has analyzed the
smart contracts and deemed them safe enough to offer
coverage at terms that are economically reasonable for
the machine.
6.5. Autonomous Contracting
The long-term vision for the vending machine is
to operate as autonomously as possible. While the
general ability to upgrade as well as unforeseeable
events require third party (participation token
holder) intervention, foreseeable activities could
be autonomously handled by the machine.
First, operational activities may be changed. If, for
example, the machine detects a malfunction, it could
start a reverse Dutch auction for the repair job. Similarly,
the machine could offer rewards for regular cleaning of
currently unused slots and autonomously buy insurance
policies.
Secondly, expansion may be an interesting
idea. Once the vending machine’s funds reach a
certain threshold, it could order the production of
a new physical machine as well as its subsequent
transportation and installation. With the original
vending machine able to reproduce, it has the potential
to create an extended network of interconnected
branches and thereby diversify risk. All of these
machines would belong to one factory (smart) contract,
which itself is owned by the participation token holders.
The correct fulfilment of contracts would be
validated by independent third parties. Payments to
contractors can only be triggered by positive signals
from such oracles. Setting the right incentives for
contractors is key, as every oracle validation comes at an
additional cost and introduces a risk of collusion. One
option may be for the machine to rely on its active sellers
to check if the state of the machine is up to par, as they
have a vested interest in the best presentation of their
goods. Moreover, contractors could be paid in vested
participation tokens, aligning the interest of the agent
with the long-term economic success of the machine.
Autonomous contracting is the most ambitious
extension and would have to be implemented with great
care, as it may introduce a variety of new attack vectors.
However, implemented successfully, it would be an
important step towards a truly autonomous vending
machine.
7. Discussion
A DAO-based vending machine offers interesting
properties as a publicly accessible, peer-to-peer
marketplace for physical goods. It mitigates
counterparty risk and thereby fosters trade in the
absence of trusted relationships. Although transactional
atomicity cannot be reached in a strict sense, since
probabilistic finality of unrestricted consensus models
may always lead to a situation in which the on-chain
transaction is excluded after the physical good has been
released (reorg or fork), the setup can be parametrized
in such a way that emulates atomicity for all practical
use cases.
Funds and goods are exchanged transparently
and deterministically under the governance of smart
contracts, with the machine acting as physical custodian
and process enforcer. The conditions of the sale
are transparently defined on the Blockchain, thus
minimizing required trust. The parties involved can
stay anonymous apart from their physical presence at
the machine. The potential for process automation
and disintermediation might reduce transaction costs
significantly. Lastly, the proposal positively affects
censorship resistance and allows anyone to participate
in the machine’s success.
The proposed setup and outlined extensions should
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be seen as an initial analysis. In particular, there are
several open points and we highly encourage further
research across the following disciplines.
Legal scholars may analyze the (corporate) status of
the vending machine and how it could fit into judicial
systems. Responsibilities of the machine in case of the
sale of illicit or counterfeit goods as well as warranty
and liability claims may offer potential for discussion.
Moreover, participation tokens are likely to qualify as
securities and fall under respective regulations.
Computer scientists and cryptographers may be
interested in studying potential attack vectors, such as
display manipulations, eclipse- or man-in-the-middle
attacks. In addition, there is a need to formalize the
system architecture and communication protocols.
Economists may be interested in analyzing the
overall efficiency, the incentive models and the auction
format. Moreover, it would be helpful to study the
complex governance systems of some of the proposed
extensions in a formal game theoretical model.
More applied research could focus on specific use
cases. For example, taking up the trend of farm-to-table
eating, an experimental variation of the proposed
vending machine could be built. The decreasing pricing
format poses a good match for perishable goods. The
same applies for the aspects of instantaneous buying
decisions, public infrastructure and goals for high slot
turnover. Located in a highly frequented area, such as
a train station, producers could use the machine to offer
their goods for sale directly, without any intermediary.
The best-before date serves as the end-point for the
auction, thus preventing food waste.
In summary, the concept offers a way to address
counterparty risk in the trade of physical goods and
emulates atomic transactions. Moreover, it allows us to
gain experience and experiment with semi-autonomous
machines. Both of these aspects are highly relevant and
a good foundation for further research.
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